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ABSTRACT

in the third quarter of 2016, and has not dropped below 75 %
of total mobile sales since late 2013, compared to Apple’s
iOS, which has failed to break 25 % in the same time frame
[2]. Yet, as Android market share reaches record highs, malware dissemination and mobile vulnerabilities have likewise
flourished, due in part to the open nature of the Android
platform, the always-connected nature of mobile devices,
and the massive adoption over other platforms. As the
number of apps in the Google Play Store has reached more
than 2.6 million, as of December 2016 [24], the opportunities
for repackaging applications with malware, or circumventing
app store security measures, become more and more viable.
Thus, the accurate detection of mobile malware is thus a
pressing issue.
The contributions of our work are summarized as follows.

Because network infrastructure and bandwidth cannot keep
up with the increasing demands, edge computing has sprung
up to reorganize the cloud computing paradigm. As an application of edge computing, mobile malware detection requires significant resources that are unavailable to individual
devices. The immediacy of malware detection is highly pertinent, as malicious software may already be in operation.
In addition, the dispersion of mobile devices and massive
simultaneous traffic make the offloading this work to remote
data centers infeasible. In our study, we implement a typical edge node to perform Android malware detection. In
our study, we collect an exceptional amount of mobile malware and benign samples, and demonstrate the ability of
edge computing nodes to provide typical security functions
for edge devices. We also show the ability to scale the operation for increasing data volumes.

• We propose an edge computing framework to provide
latency-sensitive service to network edge devices. We
then develop our proposed system architecture for an
edge computing node, including the underlying services and the proposed testbed. The designed system,
runs on Apache Hadoop, YARN, and Apache Spark
to provide parallel computing and big data processing in a cloud environment. The outlined testbed is
developed as a typical small-edge node, and our performance evaluation demonstrates the ability to scale
the system.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

Edge computing, the paradigm to offload part or all of
cloud computing to localized edge devices as needed, can
provide improved performance when network infrastructure
becomes a bottleneck to timely service. Similar to threat
monitors or sensors widely deployed in Internet [30], edge
nodes that deployed in various locations in the network,
though not on par with datacenter hardware and processing
power, can still easily serve large parallel applications and
provide responsive service for complex computation. As an
example, ability to massively scan and detect mobile malware is a pressing issue, as mobile smartphone, tablet, and
Internet-of-Things (IoT) device adoption continues to increase. Particularly, malware detection on mobile devices
faces unique challenges due to the resource-limited nature
of mobile hardware. Additionally, the ability to handle immense volumes of applications simultaneously to serve the
massive user base provides a unique challenge for cloud infrastructures.
The enormous growth in smartphone technology and
widespread adoption has afforded significant benefits to
economies worldwide. For example, the annual revenue of
the worldwide mobile market in 2016 was approximately
$ 1.05 Trillion [14]. Holding the largest market share of device operating systems, Google’s Android OS reached 88 %

• We develop and implement an Android malware detection system on our edge computing platform, utilizing
Android application Permissions as detection features,
and demonstrate its capacity to analyze big data. We
collect a significant volume of Android malware and
benign samples for machine learning-based detection.
The samples are culled from multiple sources, and our
evaluation encompasses one of the largest test datasets
for Android analysis. We conduct a performance evaluation of the developed system, comparing the efficacy
of the Naı̈ve Bayes, Decision Tree, and Logistic Regression algorithms. Our results demonstrate similar
results to other static analysis techniques that utilize
permissions for malware analysis. In addition, our results demonstrate the scalability of our system in detecting malware across a massively large application
dataset, having duplicated the data for big data testing.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we
provide background in Cloud and Edge computing, as well
as mobile malware analysis. In Section 3, we describe our
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proposed Edge Computing-based system architecture. In
Section 4, we present our case study of an Edge Computing
platform for conducting malware detection. In Section 5, we
present the results of our performance evaluation. Finally,
we conclude the paper in Section 6.

2.

Datacenter Cloud

BACKGROUND
Edge Cloud

Big Data, Cloud Computing, and Fog/Edge Computing: In the interconnected world of Big Data and IoT,
Streaming Analysis and Cloud and Fog/Edge Computing
are positioned as key assets in support of these frameworks.
Big Data, as the processing of data too large for traditional
systems, requires massively distributed processing components to handle the data in a reasonable amount of time. For
these reasons, the study of streaming data analysis, along
with the other topics mentioned above, is widespread, and
applies to every area of study.
Since the proposal of Fog computing by CISCO and
Bonomi et al. [3] in 2012, research has flourished around
the topic [17, 20, 5, 25], becoming the next great shift in
the cloud computing ecosystem. In concept, the implementation of fog computing (also called edge computing) will
realize the ability to direct long-term data dependent processing to the cloud, while simultaneously directing real-time
low-latency processes to the network edge. Through massively deployed direct communications, Fog clusters localized to the network edge will handle low-latency processing,
make cloud/fog computing decisions, perform load balancing, and provide inter-fog information transfer for continuation of mobile computing service.
Mobile Malware Detection: Extensive research has
been carried out in the interest of detecting malware for the
Android platform. Android malware detection can be carried out either statically, on the finite application package
(APK), or dynamically on the target at runtime. Though
static detection is computationally cheap, due to the target
APK file being finite in size, static detection requires tools
to decompile and extract meaningful features for analysis.
These features can be Permissions to access system services,
Intents that provide interprocess communication, API calls,
traces of specific known malware families, etc. Static detection of Android malware has been studied from various
perspectives [8, 6].
Dynamic detection instead extracts features from the application in operation, including power consumption, network traffic data, and system calls to the underlying Linux
kernel. Dynamic detection, however, is significantly more
complicated, as it requires data logging on a mobile device
with root access, or a virtual machine running on non-native
hardware, and must run for a suitable amount of time to
capture appropriate behavior. A number of dynamic analysis have also been developed, often utilizing static analysis
to support the detection [29, 26, 7]. This is often because
the unpredictable nature of runtime events, while they may
provide unique insight for detection, also can give rise to
significant noise in the data.
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Figure 1: Edge Computing Architecture

Figure 1 illstrates the layout of the edge computing architecture, with edge cloud nodes supporting mobile devices,
providing intercommunication between edges, and providing edge-to-datacenter communication for upstream offloading. In our study, we implement a typical Edge node, and
perform what would be a typical edge node task: providing malware analysis and detection for mobile devices, as an
example.
The primary software elements of the developed and implemented system are listed below.
Apache Hadoop: The Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) uses several services to perform tasks on large
amounts of data in a cluster environment. The driver service
is NameNode. This service runs only on the master node and
acts as the manager service for the entire file system, managing all of the data and all requests for client access to the
file system. The other service used by HDFS is the DataNode service. The DataNode service runs locally on each of
the nodes in the cluster. This service manages the blocks of
data that are stored locally on each of the nodes.
In order for data to be processed close to where it is being
stored in the cluster, HDFS breaks large files into smaller,
equal sized blocks. These blocks are then distributed across
the cluster. This is handled by the NameNode. The blocks
are then stored locally on the cluster nodes. These blocks
of data, as mentioned before, are managed locally on each
of the nodes by the DataNode service. In theory, if the data
is balanced across the cluster evenly, then most of the data
will be as close as possible to the computation source, thus
increasing the efficiency of the analysis [21].
YARN: Another service that is part of the Hadoop Infrastructure is YARN (Yet Another Resource Negotiator),
which serves as the resource management and job scheduling. The purpose for YARN is mainly to take the resource
management and job scheduling components of distributed
computing away from the processes that are actually processing the data. This separation allows Hadoop clusters
to be more dynamic in the kinds of applications that they
can run, as well as allows the clusters to run multiple jobs
simultaneously.
YARN is comprised of two main features: the resource
manager and the node manager. The main purpose of the
resource manager is to control access of Hadoop system re-

EDGE COMPUTING-BASED SYSTEM

In this section, we outline the architecture, system elements, and our designed testbed for malware detection.

3.1

Edge Cloud

System Architecture and Elements
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sources. The resource manager runs on the master node for
the cluster. The resource manager then sends out node manager agents to the worker nodes on the cluster. These node
managers monitor and report on the processing operations
occurring on each individual node.
When submitting an application to YARN, an application
master is created on one of the worker nodes. This application master is responsible for arbitrating the resources allocated by the resource manager, as well as communicating
with each of the worker nodes to determine application status. YARN must be configured and running on all nodes
in the cluster in order to be able to submit applications to
be run on the cluster via YARN. On each node, there is a
configuration file, in which the administrator can override
default settings that determine maximum and minimum resource allocations for the node. Adjusting the maximum
and minimum resource allocation settings in this file can
drastically impact the performance of the cluster [22].
Apache Spark: Apache Spark is an engine for big-data
processing. Spark has benefits in that it is fast in processing
data. Spark also includes APIs with pre-built components
for streaming services and machine learning for several languages, including Sala, Java, and Python. Spark performs
tasks in processes called executors. The executor processes
are housed within Spark Containers. Each executor will be
assigned one or many tasks by the Spark Application Master
and execute those tasks independent of the other executors.
Results are then returned to and aggregated at the Application Master.
YARN submission is one way to run a Spark application.
Other ways are Mesos and Spark Standalone submission.
YARN submission has several advantages over the others.
First, YARN submission is the only submission method that
allows the administrator to choose how many executors to
run on the cluster; other methods are required to run a single executor on every node in the cluster. YARN submission
is also the only submission method that allows to secure,
authenticated communication between executors, containers and nodes. Additionally, Spark submission via YARN
allows for the full scope of resource management that YARN
provides. This improves execution compared to the Spark
Standalone or Mesos resource management services.
Spark runs across the Hadoop cluster when launching an
application via YARN. First, a Spark application master will
be spawned by YARN. Next, the application master can
dynamically create YARN containers, which house Spark
executors depending on the amount of resources that are
required for completing the application. All Spark executors
will operate locally and independent of the other containers
and executors across the cluster [16, 4].

3.2

8 Update 121: Released January 17, 2017 and most recent
stable release.
The Master node and the Slave nodes are run on a Dell
PowerEdge T420 Server with virtualization software installed. The server CPU hardware consists of 2 Intel(R)
Xeon(R) CPU E5-2407 v2 @ 2.40 GHz, equating to 8 physical cores with a total of 8 CPU threads. The Server had
94 GB of usable physical RAM. The specific virtualization
software used is Proxmox Virtual Environment 4.4-1. A
64-bit Ubuntu Server 16.04 Virtual Machine (VM) is configured as previously described for the following nodes: Master, Slave-2, Slave-3, Slave-4. The master node is allocated
110 GB virtual hard drive storage, 16 GB RAM and 4 virtual
processor cores. Each of the noted slave nodes is allocated
50 GB virtual hard drive storage, 16 GB RAM and 4 virtual processor cores. The remaining slave node (Slave-1) is
hosted on a Dell OptiPlex 9010 Workstation. The workstation CPU is a single Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3570 CPU @
3.40GHz, providing 4 physical cores with 4 CPU threads.

4.

CASE STUDY: EDGE COMPUTINGPLATFORM FOR MALWARE DETECTION

In the following, we present our case study, detailing
the malware samples, detection methodology, and machine
learning algorithms used for our edge computing cluster.

4.1

Malware and Benign Application Samples

In this case study, we amass a collection of Android applications, including both malware and benign samples for
comparative analysis and machine learning assessment. Android malware, like any other type of malware, can be broken up into families based on the malware behavior and
common features. Most malware families are some combination of ransomware, Trojan horse, botnet, adware, spyware, etc., and are implemented in various different ways.
As mentioned above, the vast majority of Android malware
are repackaged versions of popular applications, intended to
trick unsuspecting users into downloading the malicious software from third-party app stores, or by providing difficult to
distinguish clones. Malware samples collected between 2010
and 2011 produced some 49 distinct malware families, while
the growth in Android malware throughout 2011 was exponential in nature [23]. As of 2017, there are now more than
175 known Android malware families [9], and ransomware is
experiencing a new surge [10].
The entire dataset of malware and benign APKs tested
comprises some 48,643 samples, from multiple sources. The
primary sources of the malware samples are the now discontinued Android Malware Genome Project [15], the Contagio Mobile [13] malware repository, and the VirusShare
[28] malware repository. Of particular note, the VirusShare
repository contains over 28 million malware samples, covering all platforms, and adding more all the time. The number
of unique malware samples used in our analysis is 17,280,
collected between 2010 to 2016, and spanning a majority
of Android malware families. Benign samples are downloaded from the Google Play Store, and the mirror websites
APKMirror [12] and APKPure [1]. The benign sample set
consists of 31,363 APKs. It is also worth noting that we
confirm selected representative malicious and benign samples through submission to VirusTotal [27] virus scanning

Testbed

The testbed environment that we design and use for analysis consists of a single master node and four slave (worker)
nodes. Each node is configured with the following software:
(i) Ubuntu Server 16.04.2 LTS (x64): Released April 21,
2016, Long Term Support Version of Ubuntu Server (Guaranteed support until April 2021), and Most recent stable
release of Ubuntu Server LTS; (ii) Apache Hadoop 2.7.3: Released August 25, 2016 and most recent stable release for the
Hadoop 2.7 line; (iii) Apache Spark 2.1.0: Released December 28, 2016, Most recent stable release, Pre-built Release
for Hadoop 2.7; (iv) Java SE Runtime Environment Version
3

service, a subsidiary of Google, that scans submitted files in
more than 56 licensed antivirus software products.

4.2

path from the root node to a leaf is known as a rule. Entropy
calculations based on one and two attributes are used to
quantify the information gain of each attribute in the tree.
Entropy values of 0 indicate that a final decision can be
made and therefore a leaf node is created. Entropy values
greater than 0 require more splits in the tree structure [18].
Logistic Regression: Logistic Regression is a prediction
model for dichotomies, problems with exactly two outcomes.
The logistic regression model is a curve constructed by computing the natural log of the odds (not probability) of a target variable(s). Any number of predictors can be used when
computing the natural log function that is used to represent the data and these predictors do not have to have equal
variance in the dataset. Related to this experiment, logistic
regression has been used due to the fact that this classification (malware or benign) is a dichotomy. The Spark engine,
when computing the model based on the training data, decides how many predictors to use and also computes the best
fit logistic curve for the dataset [19].

Permission-based Detection

Permission-based detection has been widely demonstrated
for Android malware detection. An Android .apk file (APK),
the application installation files for Android operating system, is compressed files based on the JAVA .jar. The APK
includes a file labeled AndroidManifest.xml, which defines
the Permissions, among other things, for the Android application to access operating system services. By evaluating
and comparing the requested permissions between malicious
and benign applications, we can utilize machine learning
tools to predict malicious applications.
For our implementation, Permission data is extracted
from each APK file using the Android Asset Packaging Tool,
AAPT. AAPT is a tool that can be used to unpack and
unzip APK files in order to view the data inside the package. AAPT offers support for automatic permission data
extraction upon successful unpacking. Output from AAPT
for a particular app is logged to a text file for evaluation.
The text is then transformed and formatted so that all data
for a particular application is contained on a single line.
This formatting is utilized for ease of analysis in Spark programs. In our experiment, we provide Permission data with
malicious or benign application categorization as input to
the chosen machine learning algorithms (outlined below) for
training and testing. Some 19,197 unique permissions were
identified in the sample set. These Permissions include both
generic Android permissions as well as vendor/app custom
permissions.

4.3

5.

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

In the following, we describe the performance evaluation
of our implemented edge computing node in malware detection of Android applications.
Methodology: The application that we have developed
to perform the analysis on is written in Scala 2.10, utilizing the Apache Spark API. The application is designed to
read in data from two text files, which contain Android application permissions data, one application’s data per line
of the text file. One file is dedicated to benign samples,
and the other file is dedicated to known malware samples.
This data is then converted to Scala Resilient Distributed
Datasets (RDD) in order to be processed across the cluster. The RDDs are used as input to several aforementioned
machine learning algorithms. All these machine learning algorithms are predefined in the Apache Spark API.
To prepare input data for processing Spark’s built in Term
Frequency Hashing function is utilized. Each line of text
from the input files contains the permissions information for
exactly one Android app. Using the Spark’s hashing algorithm, each line is quickly converted into a feature vector,
which is subsequently assigned a label value: 1 for a vector
representing a benign sample, and 0 for representing a malicious sample. The RDD’s containing these Labelled Point
vectors are subsequently combined into our full dataset, and
randomly divided up into two sets of vectors.
Each algorithm has been performed five times on the entire dataset utilizing four different training to testing ratios.
Training to testing ratios used were: 20 % : 80 %, 40 % :
60 %, 60 % : 40 %, and 80 % : 20 %. These tests add up to
a total of 20 iterations per algorithm. After each iteration,
output is produced to record the following data points: accuracy in detection, rate of false positive, and rate of false
negative.
Overall accuracy is computed by comparing the known
value (malware or benign) to the value predicted by the
algorithm. The number of samples that are correctly identified is then divided by the total number of samples that
are tested in that particular iteration. The number of tested
samples did not include the samples that are used to train
the model; only the number of samples that the model is
tested against are included for this count.
False positive and false negative rates are defined met-

Machine Learning Schemes

We use several representative machine learning schemes
to conduct malware detection.
Naive Bayes: Generally speaking, the Naive Bayes
learning algorithms are based on Bayes Theorem, and are
classified as generative classification algorithms. These algorithms compute the probability that a piece of data fits a
classification given a specific attribute value. All attributes
of the data are considered equally when making a prediction because of the assumption that the value of a single
attribute does not determine or affect the values of other
attributes. A form of Naive Bayes called Multinomial Naive
Bayes was used for our evaluation. This form of Naive Bayes
is specifically tailored to text file analysis, and is included in
the Apache Spark API. In this scheme, a priori probability
calculation is performed to make a prediction on the data’s
initial classification. Next, the scheme reads in the remaining input strings as evidence for final classification. Lastly,
a posteriori conditional probability, based on the gathered
evidence and the priori prediction, is computed as used as
the final prediction output [11].
Decision Tree: Decision Tree is a classification algorithm
that utilizes a tree data structure. The tree is comprised of
smaller and smaller subsets of the larger dataset that can
be used to make a decision. The tree consists of decision
nodes and leaf nodes. Different attribute values make up
the decision nodes. Attributes move from the general at
the top of the tree to the more specific near the bottom.
Based on the values of the attributes, the algorithm traverses
the tree and finally lands on a leaf node. The leaf node
contains the final classification for the piece of data. Each
4

Figure 2: Detection Accuracy vs. Training Ratio

Figure 3: False Positive Rate vs. Training Ratio

rics for incorrectly classified samples. Generally speaking,
false positive rate is computed by counting the number of
known benign samples that are predicted by the algorithm
to be malicious, then dividing by the number of samples that
are known to be benign in the testing data. False negative
rate is computed by counting the number of known malware
samples that are predicted by the algorithm to be malicious,
then dividing by the number of samples that are known to
be malicious in the testing data. The number of tested samples do not include the samples that are used to train the
model; only the number of samples that the model is tested
against are included for this count.
In addition to the aforementioned test on the original sample set, another test is run on much larger sets of duplicate
data. The original data set is duplicated 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64,
128, 256, 512, and 1024 times to produce much larger data
sets. These larger sets are used to test run time of each of
the algorithms. The original set of data is determined to be
insufficient to test run time across the cluster, and therefore,
the duplicate sets are made. The run time for each of the
larger datasets is computed by timing how long it took for
each iteration of the algorithm at 80 % training ratio.
Evaluation Results: We now present the results of our
performance evaluation. Our results show logistic regression
to be the most successful predictor of malicious content. Logistic regression peaked at a 90.26 % accuracy level for correctly predicting the classification of samples when trained
on 80 % of the dataset.
Across the four different training/testing ratios, there is
an almost negligible gain in accuracy. This is contrary to
the expected results wherein it is predicted that accuracy
would steadily increase as the models began to train on a
larger portion of the data set. This may be indicative of the
inherent limitations of using permissions alone to predict the
classification of an app. It is possible that using a relatively
small number of features to classify such a comparatively
large dataset is insufficient to achieve an accuracy rate that
is any higher.
It is clearly evident that the training to testing ratio had
a distinct impact on both false positive and false negative
rates. With a higher training ratio, it is expected that a
lower number of false positives and negatives would result.
This is precisely what the results indicate. In relation to
false categorizations, there is about a 1 % lower rate of false
negative than false positive.
Logistic Regression is the best performer with respect to
detection rate, false positives, and also performs well in the

Figure 4: False Negative Rate vs. Training Ratio

false negatives test. This is expected because of the nature
of the algorithm. As described earlier, logistic regression is
specifically designed to handle binary data classification.
To measure the scalability of the designed system, each
algorithm is tested against increasingly large datasets comprised of duplicated data from our initial set. As seen in
the figure, performance scales very favorably at the smaller
sample sizes. Given the negligible increase in run time at
these smaller datasets, we assume that the majority of the
run time on these samples is spent on cluster overhead. Only
once we reach our data set scaled by a factor of 128, we can
see the first noticeable climb in run time. From this point,
there is a roughly linear increase in run time, corresponding
to the increase in increasing size of our dataset.

6.

FINAL REMARKS

Figure 5: Running Time vs. Sample Sizes
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In this paper, we addressed the issue of detecting malware
using edge computing-based infrastructure. Particularly, we
implemented a typical edge node to perform Android malware detection. We collected an exceptional amount of mobile malware and benign samples, and demonstrated the
ability of edge computing nodes to provide typical security
functions for edge devices. We also showed the ability to
scale the operation for increasing data volumes. Based on
our experimental results, it can be concluded that utilizing
edge computing to analyze permissions data in an attempt
to determine whether an Android APK could be considered
malicious is reasonably effective. Run time in the cluster
environment proved to be highly efficient and scalable until
the maximum cluster efficiency threshold was reached.
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